Hello all, here is today's article posted on TheArmoryLife.com. It is titled “M2 Bradley — America’s Infantry Fighting Vehicle” and can be found at https://www.thearmorylife.com/m2-bradley-infantry-fighting-vehicle/.
M2 Bradley — America’s Infantry Fighting Vehicle
- Thread starter Mike H.
- Start date
Cedric
Professional
Where to start:
I was a gunnery OIC for the M3 Follow on Test and Evaluation at Ft. Knox and I was on an M3A2 in the Gulf War so I have some observations.
- I'd like to know the source for Bradleys killing more enemy tanks the the Abrams. One cannot shoot while moving with a TOW missile and one cannot penetrate even an an older T-55 unless within 500m. Scout pure units with only M3s which were up against Iraqi tank units were on the short end without Abrams in the formation.
- How much armor do we need? In relative terms the M3A2 had improved armor than it's predecessor base line model and had add on kits for additional armor plates. This meant the A2 had a larger and more powerful engine with a super charger, not turbo charger (too loud IMO) and we find ourselves in a typical do loop of more armor, more engine, etc. How about the old adage of let's employ the thing IAW with its role and capabilities?
- Valid points on a one size fits all for recon and infantry. DoD wants "efficiency" rather than satisfying operational and tactical requirements. We had a better family of light vehicles for recon squadrons in WWII. Some of these proved deficient outside of the recon role to counter unexpected situations but the blueprint for its day was sound. Think of equipping the squadron with all half-tracks and I think you get my drift.
- Armor goes up, more add-ons inside, and numbers of infantry goes down. As one military historian out it, if we focus solely on vulnerability, the infantryman would have disappeared from the battlefield a long time ago. What's interesting is that one of the reasons the M10 Booker was cancelled is it became too heavy beyond the original specs.
I was a gunnery OIC for the M3 Follow on Test and Evaluation at Ft. Knox and I was on an M3A2 in the Gulf War so I have some observations.
- I'd like to know the source for Bradleys killing more enemy tanks the the Abrams. One cannot shoot while moving with a TOW missile and one cannot penetrate even an an older T-55 unless within 500m. Scout pure units with only M3s which were up against Iraqi tank units were on the short end without Abrams in the formation.
- How much armor do we need? In relative terms the M3A2 had improved armor than it's predecessor base line model and had add on kits for additional armor plates. This meant the A2 had a larger and more powerful engine with a super charger, not turbo charger (too loud IMO) and we find ourselves in a typical do loop of more armor, more engine, etc. How about the old adage of let's employ the thing IAW with its role and capabilities?
- Valid points on a one size fits all for recon and infantry. DoD wants "efficiency" rather than satisfying operational and tactical requirements. We had a better family of light vehicles for recon squadrons in WWII. Some of these proved deficient outside of the recon role to counter unexpected situations but the blueprint for its day was sound. Think of equipping the squadron with all half-tracks and I think you get my drift.
- Armor goes up, more add-ons inside, and numbers of infantry goes down. As one military historian out it, if we focus solely on vulnerability, the infantryman would have disappeared from the battlefield a long time ago. What's interesting is that one of the reasons the M10 Booker was cancelled is it became too heavy beyond the original specs.
Talyn
SAINT
Agree with 90-95% of what Cedric says.
Cedric would likely agree that US/Western armor has a premium on crew protection, plus the extra other sensors, etc., which results in increased weight. While they can be lost, and often recovered and repairs US/Western are praised for crew survival.
The sands of the Middle East & now the plains of Ukraine are littered with the detritus of Soviet/Russian armor that don't put a premium on crew-protection because they are lighter-weight. They literally disintegrate when hit as indicated by the Ukraine coverage, and 25mm M2ODSs in Ukraine have defeated the most advanced Russians MBTs.
GW-era M2/M3s base-weight were 30 tons which increased to the current A4/A4E1 weight of 40 tons. The M10 Booker base-weight is 38 tons. Modular add-on armor packages incrementally add weight up to 48 tons. These add-on packages would be affixed once in the AOPs once everything arrived.
No M2A4's are air-dropped, but are air-transportable in C-17/C-5s, as the M10 Booker can be, as originally intended for the ICBTs, two Airborne Divisions and the 4th Infantry.
The US has had this fantasy of having a survivable light tank that can be air-dropped from a C-130 for decades, and various attempts have been lacking. The latest that entered service was the M551 (~16 tons) which had its survivability issues.
The US tried again with two light-weight armored (wheeled) vehicles based on the LV/Stryker platform with the US Army M1128 MGS (18.5 tons) and the USMC LAV-105 (16 tons), both with 105mm guns. Only the M1128 made it into service "briefly" for several reasons. Both services still rely on LAV/Stryker variants for other roles albeit with their inherent survivability issues.
With further M10 production ended, now all IBCTs will covert to Mobile Brigade Combat Teams, equipped with the M1301 infantry squad vehicle to enhance mobility. The M1301 ISV is a derivative of the Chevy compact truck, and while helo/C-130 mobile survivability is questionable.
So, the moral of the story is an "air-droppable" light tank is unattainable unless a "new" M551 is resurrected with a conventional gun (a 76mm & 105mm (both low-recoil types) was tested) vs. the original M81E3 152mm.
But then, someone will complain it's not as survivable as a M10.
With M68 = major recoil issues
With M-41 Bulldog M32A1 76 mm gun = OK
I still think that there's a place for the M10 Booker for the light-rapid deployment forces since at its base-weight two can be transported in a C-17, and the 105mm is still an effective gun.
With the USMC getting rid of it's M1 Abrams it could give the USMC more effective firepower than its old AAV and new ACV (32-35 tons) with nothing more than a 30mm Mk.44, to shore via their LCACs.
My .02.
Cedric
Professional
I would only add that the Stryker was pitched as an interim vehicle until the Future Combat System was fielded which never happened. As is the case, rather than being viewed as temporary, the Stryker took on a life of its own with no discernible advantage over the M113A3 unless you count that it had a TV screen. I am not saying that M113A3 is a suitable substitute for a Bradley in the main battle area role, but is one of the worlds most successful light armored vehicles in the world in certain situations. That we embarked on Stryker as a temporary solution to the FCS road to no where makes the Pentagon Wars look like child's play.
One other thing about Russian tanks. Their defects actually continue from the manufacture of the T-34. The T-34 was not all it is cracked up to be. Poor design, faulty and hastily put together with many of them having armor plates which had gaps instead of solid seams. Russian tanks now rely on welded armor rather than the more solid cast armor, the main factory for cast turrets is located in...wait for it...Ukraine.
One other thing about Russian tanks. Their defects actually continue from the manufacture of the T-34. The T-34 was not all it is cracked up to be. Poor design, faulty and hastily put together with many of them having armor plates which had gaps instead of solid seams. Russian tanks now rely on welded armor rather than the more solid cast armor, the main factory for cast turrets is located in...wait for it...Ukraine.
Talyn
SAINT
To add, in the "old" Soviet Union Ukraine was the key region for military ground/air/missile developments, as per your comment. Plus, with it's rich natural resources Czar VP wants it back.
The early flat-bottom Strykers had IED issues that the V-hull later models evolved to address.
The FCS Program had a whole slew of very light-weight vehicles in the que until the "sandbox-era" and massive cost over-runs ended the FCS, while the other Services' Zumwalt/LCS & F-35 sucked $$ out of purchasing/upgrades to various more useful platforms were truncated.
We'll see how "light" the forthcoming M1A3 pencils out at. I'm guessing only a 10 ton weight savings.
Plus, there's some really nice foreign-developed platforms that the US could adopt & put into domestic production a lot faster than developing something that the US dump a lot of $$ into then cancels.
And the M10 "bridge-excuse" at Ft. Campbell is a very laughable one.
My .02