I enjoyed reading the article titled WAS THE ATOMIC BOMBING OF JAPAN NECESSARY? By Tom Laemlein in the January 2026 issue of The Arsenal Life however I feel compelled to point out some things I feel are flaws.
First, The article neither justifies the use of the atomic bombs nor makes a case that they should not have been used. The article consists of some statements, regurgitations from a single service post war prospective and a dismissal of conditions as they were believed to exist on the ground in Japan in the late summer of 1945. He makes, among other statements, that Japan
Second, in the portion of his presentation of Mr. Laemlein completely disregards that “Japan was utterly finished as a war making nation before the first bomb was dropped.” He made that statement based on a quote from Prince Higashi-Kuni, 5 September 1945,
“Production of military supplies, which had been seriously affected by curtailment of our marine transportation facilities, was dealt a severe blow by this turn of the war situation, and almost insuperable difficulties began to multiply, beginning with the spring of this year.”
Notice the underlined phrases. Yes, shipbuilding was reduced to nearly nothing and aircraft production was reduced but not zeroed out. In fact, there were far more aircraft than skilled pilots. That was a known fact. The Army was still expanding for homeland defense. Basic small arms and munitions production was adequate for the Army and Naval units converted to ground forces. Yes, civilian defense forces that augmented the military were in some cases, armed with nothing more than farm tools and spears but the military was effectively rearming. Yes, many combat systems were antiquated by Western standards of 1945 but they were still effective as is evident by the casualties inflicted during the Liberation of the Philippines, and Operations Detachment & Iceberg. Yes, the U.S. inflected over a half a million Japanese and auxiliary casualties during these operations however these engagements were seen by the Japanese as strategic delaying actions to allow the Home Armies time to mobilize, arm, train, deploy to operational areas and prepare defensive positions on the home islands.
Third, Mr. Laemlein stated his moral difficulty with selecting a target for the use of the Atomic bombs. The article uses the post war photos of the “Devastation” caused by the bomb drop on Hiroshima. In my opinion he should have contrasted that with the image of the Fifth Marine Amphibious Corps Cemetery’s on Iwo Jima where the number of U.S. casualties exceeded the number of defenders. I mean no disrespect to Mr. Laemline but I see no mention of service in the military in his biography. I am therefor not sure that he completely comprehends the duties of commander, 1st Accomplish the Mission, 2nd Protect your men. Having served in the military The President, the Secretaries of War & Navy all understood this duty. As the decision to use the Atomic Bomb was ultimately the President’s alone, and he was very aware of the ongoing loss of life amongst the service men and women in the Pacific Theater of Operations. It’s not surprising at all that he chose to use the most powerful weapon available to end the war and save U.S. lives. To not do so would be unimaginable to me. By the time the decision to use the Atomic Bomb was made the U.S. had suffered approximately 148,000 total casualties in in the Liberation of the Philippines, Operations Detachment (Iwo Jima) and Iceberg (Okinawa) with approximately 40,000 of those killed in action. Secondary to the cost in lives is the cost in U.S. treasury. It is estimate that in 1945 the U.S. was spending $2,000,000.00 per-day or 40% of its GDP annually. In his case for invasion, General MacArthur, pointed out he believed that once the Ground Forces broke the crust of the defense at the waterline casualties would decrease. In my opinion there is very little evidence to support this belief once combat was joined on the Home Islands. Certainly operations beginning at Tarawa, Attu, Peleliu, Eniwetok, Iwo Jima and Okinawa don’t support this belief. What the men in assault & invasion forces worried about was a repetitive series of heavily fortified and defended Iwo Jima and Okinawa’s created by the terrain of Japan.
Fourth, Mr. Laemlein didn’t mention any concern for loss of life amongst the Japanese. He addresses Secretary of War Stimson’s “lecture” to General Arnold on the problems of attacks on urban area. This lecture was directed at the effects of bombing on urban areas. Secretary Stimson was very aware of the effects of the Combined Bomber Offensive of the U.S. 8th Air Force and British Bomber Command on European cities and the Luftwaffe on British cities. At the time discussions on the use of an Atomic Bomb on Japan the U.S. 20th Air Force had only been conducting strikes on Japan since June 1944, a little over 2 years since the first attack by the Dolittle Raiders. It was not until March of 1945 when fire bombing began that the attacks were truly effective. Secretary Stimson’s concern was that the Atomic Bomb’s use would so shock the Japanese leadership that they would capitulate thereby saving human life.
In conclusion Mr. Laemlein’s article failed to match the title in many ways. His primary information sources appear to have all been slanted to an aviation point of view. He made no mention of the U.S. submarine campaign that decimated the Japanese commercial fleet and isolated the Home Islands from much needed resources. He made no mention of the still functional Imperial Japanese Army. He never addressed the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force. He made no mention of the Soviet operations that we knew were scheduled to commence in East Asia and in fact were steam rolling through Manchuria 2 days after the bombing of Hiroshima.
First, The article neither justifies the use of the atomic bombs nor makes a case that they should not have been used. The article consists of some statements, regurgitations from a single service post war prospective and a dismissal of conditions as they were believed to exist on the ground in Japan in the late summer of 1945. He makes, among other statements, that Japan
Second, in the portion of his presentation of Mr. Laemlein completely disregards that “Japan was utterly finished as a war making nation before the first bomb was dropped.” He made that statement based on a quote from Prince Higashi-Kuni, 5 September 1945,
“Production of military supplies, which had been seriously affected by curtailment of our marine transportation facilities, was dealt a severe blow by this turn of the war situation, and almost insuperable difficulties began to multiply, beginning with the spring of this year.”
Notice the underlined phrases. Yes, shipbuilding was reduced to nearly nothing and aircraft production was reduced but not zeroed out. In fact, there were far more aircraft than skilled pilots. That was a known fact. The Army was still expanding for homeland defense. Basic small arms and munitions production was adequate for the Army and Naval units converted to ground forces. Yes, civilian defense forces that augmented the military were in some cases, armed with nothing more than farm tools and spears but the military was effectively rearming. Yes, many combat systems were antiquated by Western standards of 1945 but they were still effective as is evident by the casualties inflicted during the Liberation of the Philippines, and Operations Detachment & Iceberg. Yes, the U.S. inflected over a half a million Japanese and auxiliary casualties during these operations however these engagements were seen by the Japanese as strategic delaying actions to allow the Home Armies time to mobilize, arm, train, deploy to operational areas and prepare defensive positions on the home islands.
Third, Mr. Laemlein stated his moral difficulty with selecting a target for the use of the Atomic bombs. The article uses the post war photos of the “Devastation” caused by the bomb drop on Hiroshima. In my opinion he should have contrasted that with the image of the Fifth Marine Amphibious Corps Cemetery’s on Iwo Jima where the number of U.S. casualties exceeded the number of defenders. I mean no disrespect to Mr. Laemline but I see no mention of service in the military in his biography. I am therefor not sure that he completely comprehends the duties of commander, 1st Accomplish the Mission, 2nd Protect your men. Having served in the military The President, the Secretaries of War & Navy all understood this duty. As the decision to use the Atomic Bomb was ultimately the President’s alone, and he was very aware of the ongoing loss of life amongst the service men and women in the Pacific Theater of Operations. It’s not surprising at all that he chose to use the most powerful weapon available to end the war and save U.S. lives. To not do so would be unimaginable to me. By the time the decision to use the Atomic Bomb was made the U.S. had suffered approximately 148,000 total casualties in in the Liberation of the Philippines, Operations Detachment (Iwo Jima) and Iceberg (Okinawa) with approximately 40,000 of those killed in action. Secondary to the cost in lives is the cost in U.S. treasury. It is estimate that in 1945 the U.S. was spending $2,000,000.00 per-day or 40% of its GDP annually. In his case for invasion, General MacArthur, pointed out he believed that once the Ground Forces broke the crust of the defense at the waterline casualties would decrease. In my opinion there is very little evidence to support this belief once combat was joined on the Home Islands. Certainly operations beginning at Tarawa, Attu, Peleliu, Eniwetok, Iwo Jima and Okinawa don’t support this belief. What the men in assault & invasion forces worried about was a repetitive series of heavily fortified and defended Iwo Jima and Okinawa’s created by the terrain of Japan.
Fourth, Mr. Laemlein didn’t mention any concern for loss of life amongst the Japanese. He addresses Secretary of War Stimson’s “lecture” to General Arnold on the problems of attacks on urban area. This lecture was directed at the effects of bombing on urban areas. Secretary Stimson was very aware of the effects of the Combined Bomber Offensive of the U.S. 8th Air Force and British Bomber Command on European cities and the Luftwaffe on British cities. At the time discussions on the use of an Atomic Bomb on Japan the U.S. 20th Air Force had only been conducting strikes on Japan since June 1944, a little over 2 years since the first attack by the Dolittle Raiders. It was not until March of 1945 when fire bombing began that the attacks were truly effective. Secretary Stimson’s concern was that the Atomic Bomb’s use would so shock the Japanese leadership that they would capitulate thereby saving human life.
In conclusion Mr. Laemlein’s article failed to match the title in many ways. His primary information sources appear to have all been slanted to an aviation point of view. He made no mention of the U.S. submarine campaign that decimated the Japanese commercial fleet and isolated the Home Islands from much needed resources. He made no mention of the still functional Imperial Japanese Army. He never addressed the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force. He made no mention of the Soviet operations that we knew were scheduled to commence in East Asia and in fact were steam rolling through Manchuria 2 days after the bombing of Hiroshima.
