Anchorite
Professional
Guys, it's a limited opinion upholding the Fifth Circuit’s decision that § 922(g)(3), unlawful possession of a firearm anyone who is an unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled substance, was unconstitutional as applied to Hemani. Hemani has US and Pakistani citizenship but was born and raised in the US. He and his parents were investigated for terrorism related activities; and, during the search of the house, officers found marijuana—which Hemani claimed and said he used regularly—and cocaine—which he also claimed but said he hadn’t used recently. Hemani also surrendered a firearm he had in the house. Months later, Hemani was indicted in federal court under 922(g)(3) and only for that charge.
The Court applied Bruen’s “test” to decide that historical analogues to § 922(g)(3) were not similar enough to salvage.
The Court stressed that because it was never alleged that Hemani was an addict, that the decision did not address the aspect of 922(g)(3) dealing with addicts. Nor does it consider how it might apply to people “presently intoxicated.” It also stressed that this decision should not be seen as casting doubt on any other aspect of § 922(g).
While this is definitely good for Hemani and may well help some people—§ 922(g)(3) is rarely charged as the Court noted—I wouldn’t bet on this decision being particularly useful for challenging anything other than situations where someone is charged with violating § 922(g)(3) for possessing a firearm while occasionally smoking pot. Don’t count this applying to other drugs since the Court referenced the fact that pot was changed from schedule I to schedule III this year.
The Court applied Bruen’s “test” to decide that historical analogues to § 922(g)(3) were not similar enough to salvage.
The Court stressed that because it was never alleged that Hemani was an addict, that the decision did not address the aspect of 922(g)(3) dealing with addicts. Nor does it consider how it might apply to people “presently intoxicated.” It also stressed that this decision should not be seen as casting doubt on any other aspect of § 922(g).
While this is definitely good for Hemani and may well help some people—§ 922(g)(3) is rarely charged as the Court noted—I wouldn’t bet on this decision being particularly useful for challenging anything other than situations where someone is charged with violating § 922(g)(3) for possessing a firearm while occasionally smoking pot. Don’t count this applying to other drugs since the Court referenced the fact that pot was changed from schedule I to schedule III this year.