The Noble (but Doomed) M551 Sheridan in Vietnam

[Cedric]

We had A1s with LRF by the time I arrived in the 2d ACR in May of '76. IIRC they said the LRFs arrived in '75. The local German newspapers opined that US forces were now equipped with death rays.

Speaking of the M60A2, had a family member who was a warrant officer up in Warren, MI working on the A2. He said it was the most slipshod development process he ever saw. The solution to problems became just hang another electronic box inside somewhere which may or may not impede crew functioning. A real mess. Eventually, M60A2s were consolidated into one battalion in each division were it became a defacto tank destroyer battalion.

 

[Ascout]

We had A1s with LRF by the time I arrived in the 2d ACR in May of '76. IIRC they said the LRFs arrived in '75. The local German newspapers opined that US forces were now equipped with death rays.

Speaking of the M60A2, had a family member who was a warrant officer up in Warren, MI working on the A2. He said it was the most slipshod development process he ever saw. The solution to problems became just hang another electronic box inside somewhere which may or may not impede crew functioning. A real mess. Eventually, M60A2s were consolidated into one battalion in each division were it became a defacto tank destroyer battalion.

Speaking of "death rays", when I was on the "Hot Pants" M60A1 track skirt project, we had just finished the Hughes LRF test and still had the vehicle, as well as it's array of "Danger-LASER Light" signs. The idea was floated to stuff some impressive pipe into the cupola, hang the LASER signs on it and run an uncaptioned photo in Armor Magazine just to get the Russians jumping through their ass trying to figure out what it was.
I was on the M60A2 Initial Production Test at the Armor Board in 1973, which was ongoing when the October War broke out. Guess what contributed to the acceptance of the A2 when POTUS promised to make good the IDF tank losses in the first couple of days.
The archival collection of the M551 & M60A2 development from the named GS-13 below at Combat Dev. Cmd. came into my hands years ago...it's a very sordid story.

 

[Cedric]

Speaking of "death rays", when I was on the "Hot Pants" M60A1 track skirt project, we had just finished the Hughes LRF test and still had the vehicle, as well as it's array of "Danger-LASER Light" signs. The idea was floated to stuff some impressive pipe into the cupola, hang the LASER signs on it and run an uncaptioned photo in Armor Magazine just to get the Russians jumping through their ass trying to figure out what it was.
I was on the M60A2 Initial Production Test at the Armor Board in 1973, which was ongoing when the October War broke out. Guess what contributed to the acceptance of the A2 when POTUS promised to make good the IDF tank losses in the first couple of days.
The archival collection of the M551 & M60A2 development from the named GS-13 below at Combat Dev. Cmd. came into my hands years ago...it's a very sordid story.

And ironically, the October War showed that in spite of long range fields of fire, gun tube to gun tube engagements still occurred in which the A2's missilery would have been useless.

 

[SL66]

I love hearing from the Veterans in our forum about their personal experiences when an article like this is posted. I am eternally greatful for your service and proud to call you friends. Thank you all for your service/sacrifice.

 

[Ascout]

And ironically, the October War showed that in spite of long range fields of fire, gun tube to gun tube engagements still occurred in which the A2's missilery would have been useless.

 

[Cedric]

Thank goodness these eggheads and their weapons eventually went the way of the dodo.

 

[Ascout]

Thank goodness these eggheads and their weapons eventually went the way of the dodo.

Their legacy lives on. Thanks to British and German defense planners, they each designed the major weapon systems on our main battle tanks from the L7 105mm (M68 is U.S. service) and ultimately the Rheinmetall 120mm smoothbore.
We have not designed a main gun adopted by our front-line Armor since before Korea.
Speakers notes to the Armor community leadership. The speaker was the invited tank historian, the late Richard Ogorkiewicz, author/consultant to any number of Western powers. The text is from one of his several books, then in preparation. From the archives of a Combat Dev. Cmd. member, I do not know whether the speaker or the audience member made the notations.
They loaded in opposite order....read the second attachment first.

 

[Cedric]

Their legacy lives on. Thanks to British and German defense planners, they each designed the major weapon systems on our main battle tanks from the L7 105mm (M68 is U.S. service) and ultimately the Rheinmetall 120mm smoothbore.
We have not designed a main gun adopted by our front-line Armor since before Korea.
Speakers notes to the Armor community leadership. The speaker was the invited tank historian, the late Richard Ogorkiewicz, author/consultant to any number of Western powers. The text is from one of his several books, then in preparation. From the archives of a Combat Dev. Cmd. member, I do not know whether the speaker or the audience member made the notations.
They loaded in opposite order....read the second attachment first.

Not to mention fog, rain, obscuration of IR tracking flares of both TOW and Shillelagh. All of this reeks of pure McNamara type analysis. Not to mention the infantry community jumped on the "we need a fire and forget weapon system." We've had one for decades, it's called a tank gun.

 

[Ascout]

Not to mention fog, rain, obscuration of IR tracking flares of both TOW and Shillelagh. All of this reeks of pure McNamara type analysis. Not to mention the infantry community jumped on the "we need a fire and forget weapon system." We've had one for decades, it's called a tank gun.

There really wasn't an issue with the "gun" specifically...it was that existing FCS could not cope well with ranges of 2K and above. Entirely reasonable ranges for European combat, but our hit rate with 105's was not great beyond 1,500 meters (The Army's own figures for first round hit probability were from .27-.38).
The language of the day did not include "fire and forget", it was expressed in missilery as "homing", which was recognized to be limited by technology to at least 10 years (it turned out to be 30).
The default, and the great limitation, was to accept command guidance. And it didn't help that the time-of-flight was obscene. It was the one parameter that the Army was willing to accept on the M551 just to get it into production, but rejected it out of hand for the future MBT project (at the time, the MBT-70). In the event, we did exactly that with no modification or improvements (nor would there be any...the R&D team for the MGM-51 dissolved in 1971 when it was fully commoditized.

 

[Cedric]

There really wasn't an issue with the "gun" specifically...it was that existing FCS could not cope well with ranges of 2K and above. Entirely reasonable ranges for European combat, but our hit rate with 105's was not great beyond 1,500 meters (The Army's own figures for first round hit probability were from .27-.38).
The language of the day did not include "fire and forget", it was expressed in missilery as "homing", which was recognized to be limited by technology to at least 10 years (it turned out to be 30).
The default, and the great limitation, was to accept command guidance. And it didn't help that the time-of-flight was obscene. It was the one parameter that the Army was willing to accept on the M551 just to get it into production, but rejected it out of hand for the future MBT project (at the time, the MBT-70). In the event, we did exactly that with no modification or improvements (nor would there be any...the R&D team for the MGM-51 dissolved in 1971 when it was fully commoditized.

Official language was not fire and forget, yet that phrase popped up consistently in the anti-armor community.

 

[Ascout]

Official language was not fire and forget, yet that phrase popped up consistently in the anti-armor community.

I can't speak to the anti-armor community, not being sure what that is but the two documents in the Armor community that drove the armament decisions of the '60's were ARCOVE & "Mobility, Firepower & Protection", 1958-59. F&F does not occur once in that or any documents that recently followed (to include the Tripartite Conferences in Armor). I'm sure the term existed in the aviation community, but they have a different budget and capabilities, esp. in 1958.

 

[BassCliff]

Hi,

I'm glad this thread popped back up. The discussion has been even more interesting than the article. My sincere thanks to all of you who served. This nation is in your debt. Blessings to all.


Thank you for your indulgence,

BassCliff

 

[Ascout]

Hi,

I'm glad this thread popped back up. The discussion has been even more interesting than the article. My sincere thanks to all of you who served. This nation is in your debt. Blessings to all.


Thank you for your indulgence,

BassCliff

Glad to know there are those who appreciate it. Some years ago I came into possession of digital copies of many archival documents (that have long since been de-classified). Much of it never intended to see the light of day, it lays out the history of tank development here most especially since WWII when a whole area of tech was about to open up. Much of it from a senior figure at Combat Developments Command with emphasis on the MGM-51 Shillelagh, M551 Sheridan, M60A2 development and fielding, among others. His archives indicate a very specific emphasis on documenting the development history of these subjects, certainly in part because the sordid nature of the story.
It's all very compelling to me because I served on all of those systems and worked for the Armor Board where we tested aspects of all of them.

 

[Cedric]

I can't speak to the anti-armor community, not being sure what that is but the two documents in the Armor community that drove the armament decisions of the '60's were ARCOVE & "Mobility, Firepower & Protection", 1958-59. F&F does not occur once in that or any documents that recently followed (to include the Tripartite Conferences in Armor). I'm sure the term existed in the aviation community, but they have a different budget and capabilities, esp. in 1958.

"Anti-armor community" = infantry branch primarily. In fact there was an Armor - Anti Armor office in the Pentagon up through the Gulf War IIRC. A former CO of mine had a tour there.

 

[Cedric]

Glad to know there are those who appreciate it. Some years ago I came into possession of digital copies of many archival documents (that have long since been de-classified). Much of it never intended to see the light of day, it lays out the history of tank development here most especially since WWII when a whole area of tech was about to open up. Much of it from a senior figure at Combat Developments Command with emphasis on the MGM-51 Shillelagh, M551 Sheridan, M60A2 development and fielding, among others. His archives indicate a very specific emphasis on documenting the development history of these subjects, certainly in part because the sordid nature of the story.
It's all very compelling to me because I served on all of those systems and worked for the Armor Board where we tested aspects of all of them.

As equally as sordid was the development of the Apache and the concurrent effort to have aviation as a separate branch. In the late 70s/early 80s as a ground guy, though having worked with aviation for about a year, my time in training development put me in a position to work with Dir. of Armor Aviation. Short version: there was a whole lot of fudging going on there, too.

 

[Ascout]

As equally as sordid was the development of the Apache and the concurrent effort to have aviation as a separate branch. In the late 70s/early 80s as a ground guy, though having worked with aviation for about a year, my time in training development put me in a position to work with Dir. of Armor Aviation. Short version: there was a whole lot of fudging going on there, too.

"Fudging". Yep. Background: the XM409 HEAT round (the principle anti-armor round at sub-missile ranges) had a nasty reputation, both for premature detonations and of course like all conventional rounds, bad outcomes when smouldering bits of combustible case remained in the gun tube to detonate the next round when loaded. The HEAT round problem was a fusing issue, but the Armor Board did a hasty test in '69 and advised against fielding it (this was ignored). This testing is referenced in the letter but not then completed.
Another GS over at CDC, a former LTC, felt compelled to relate a conversation he'd recently had in the form of a "Memorandum For the Record". You will recognize this as an unsolicited testimony to be read into the record "to whom it might concern" now or in the future. In effect, it both relates a disturbing irregularity as well as putting other on notice what they might expect in the way of testimony should it be investigated.
I have been advised by those well above my pay grade that an O5 would not likely generate one of these unless he had support from above. This would be a career-ending move without support. The highlights are mine from another application...

 

[Cedric]

"Fudging". Yep. Background: the XM409 HEAT round (the principle anti-armor round at sub-missile ranges) had a nasty reputation, both for premature detonations and of course like all conventional rounds, bad outcomes when smouldering bits of combustible case remained in the gun tube to detonate the next round when loaded. The HEAT round problem was a fusing issue, but the Armor Board did a hasty test in '69 and advised against fielding it (this was ignored). This testing is referenced in the letter but not then completed.
Another GS over at CDC, a former LTC, felt compelled to relate a conversation he'd recently had in the form of a "Memorandum For the Record". You will recognize this as an unsolicited testimony to be read into the record "to whom it might concern" now or in the future. In effect, it both relates a disturbing irregularity as well as putting other on notice what they might expect in the way of testimony should it be investigated.
I have been advised by those well above my pay grade that an O5 would not likely generate one of these unless he had support from above. This would be a career-ending move without support. The highlights are mine from another application...

Wow. Did not know the background of the round in the late 60s. All I can say is that we didn't have a problem with the heat round and by the time I got to USAREUR the CBSS was working as intended. OTOH, some mensa decided that we would fire the HE round one gunnery at Graf. I mentioned to someone: "so let me get this straight. These were shipped to VN, sat somewhere in storage in some of the most humid weather on the planet, then shipped back when???, more storage somewhere??? and then issued to troops. What could possibly go wrong?" How about rounds breaking in half when loaded with propellant rolling around the turret floor. The things we do to satisfy project manager egos.

 

[rcurtner]

Not to mention fog, rain, obscuration of IR tracking flares of both TOW and Shillelagh. All of this reeks of pure McNamara type analysis. Not to mention the infantry community jumped on the "we need a fire and forget weapon system." We've had one for decades, it's called a tank gun.

Yes indeed. Can't remember the range distances at Graph but do remember many first round hits on stationary & moving targets. ( 65-67 M60's & A1's )

 

[Ascout]

Wow. Did not know the background of the round in the late 60s. All I can say is that we didn't have a problem with the heat round and by the time I got to USAREUR the CBSS was working as intended. OTOH, some mensa decided that we would fire the HE round one gunnery at Graf. I mentioned to someone: "so let me get this straight. These were shipped to VN, sat somewhere in storage in some of the most humid weather on the planet, then shipped back when???, more storage somewhere??? and then issued to troops. What could possibly go wrong?" How about rounds breaking in half when loaded with propellant rolling around the turret floor. The things we do to satisfy project manager egos.

Well, we didn't have HEAT in VN, it was all about HE and Can there. The 152 round comes with a neoprene "rubber" around the case to mitigate moisture being absorbed. This only comes off when loading the round.
The issue of Project Management for Sheridan/Shillelagh (the two programs were combined in 1964) and for years the PM was essentially what we call today, a "czar". He could issue requirements to various commands in a manner much like "Silverplate" in the Manhattan Project. This was much resented and Missile Command was essentially getting "task orders" and being gofers for the PM. As MICOM was commanded by a MG Zierdt, this was unwieldy. He eventually went on record as saying the situation "was not working and would not work". This is essentially an ultimatum from a CG. "Fix it or fire me". They did change it, after years were lost.
Here are a few examples of what happens when a PM runs amuck with no checks or balances. Note especially the memo from the inspection of the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant....one of the most damning assessments I've ever seen in an official memo that wasn't in the heat of combat.

 

[Ascout]

Yes indeed. Can't remember the range distances at Graph but do remember many first round hits on stationary & moving targets. ( 65-67 M60's & A1's )

Official Army figures that appear in reports until the late 1950's cited a first round hit probability at 2K of .27-.38. The practical range with the tech of the 50's-60's for a first round hit was 1,500 meters. Entirely practical for a European war in the projected theater, but not good enough for elsewhere.
In 1969 there was an urgently requested meeting by MICOM of the Armor community to discuss discrepant results. A lot of interesting topics were raised including range and one of the best remarks was by an O6 with WWII armor experience and he noted "that 3,000 meters was still a long damn way to acquire and service a target, even in the desert".